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Interest in prediction markets has increased in the last decade, among participants, 
private-sector market operators, policymakers and academics.  For instance, markets on 
the 2004 U.S. election were far more numerous and liquid than they were in 2000.  
Whereas past media coverage of these markets often treated them as curiosities, coverage 
in the 2004 election cycle was far more frequent and more serious than 4 years before.
1  
Academics are using prediction markets to provide a measure of expectations about an 
event’s probability, and then using the co-movement of this measure and financial asset 
prices to extract information about the expected effects of political decisions (Slemrod 
and Greimel, 1999 and Knight, 2003), in some cases even before the decision is made 
(Leigh, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz, 2003).  In the last year, this style of analysis has spread 
beyond academia, mostly notably in attempts to analyze the consequences of Bush’s re-
election.  Formal analyses of these markets have tended to conclude that their prices can 
be useful indicators of likely future outcomes. 
Interest in new applications of prediction markets is focused in three domains: 
forecasting, decision making, and risk management. 
The success of corporate prediction markets in forecasting printer sales (Chen and 
Plott, 2002) and project management (Ortner, 2002) has stimulated interest in their 
application to other business problems, and firms such as NewsFutures, Net Exchange 
and Incentive Markets have sprung up to meet this demand.  Among the applications 
being discussed are “decision markets” in which securities are traded that pay off based 
on an outcome (e.g., revenue from a product) if and only if a particular decision is made 
(e.g., the product is launched).  The idea behind these markets is to elicit knowledge from 
within an organization that might otherwise be lost somewhere in a poor organizational 
form. 
Similar ideas have been discussed in the policy realm.  DARPA’s Policy Analysis 
Market would have launched securities designed to capture the probability of specific 
events, along with contingent securities designed to capture the outcome of specific 
                                                 
1  For example, a Factiva search for mentions of “Iowa Electronic Markets” from January 1 to November 1 
yielded 27 hits in 2000 and 100 in 2004.  Adding the largest private-sector market, Tradesports.com (and 
its politics-only subsidiary Intrade) to the search increases the number of 2004 hits to 237.    2
policies.  During the 2004 primary season, the Iowa markets ran securities designed to 
predict the general election success of the Democratic contenders, while later in the year 
Tradesports ran similar contracts designed to capture the effects of geopolitical and 
economic events on the election (see Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004b for details).  
Abramowicz (2004) and Hahn and Tetlock (2004) envision using prediction markets to 
assist in policy making by extracting expert opinion in a credible and objective manner.  
Hanson (2003) goes even further, arguing that policy makers should simply define a 
“GDP+” measure of social welfare, and that policy decisions should be based entirely on 
market-based predictions of which policies maximize this social welfare measure. 
Finally, some envision prediction markets as the first step toward markets where 
participants could hedge their exposure to political and economic events.  For example, 
an employee in a “Bush industry” (e.g., traditional energy) could sell Tradesports’ Bush 
reelection contract to an employee in a “Kerry industry” (e.g., alternative energy); both 
would be hedging their human-capital exposure to the election.  The Tradesports Bush 
reelection contract had trade volume of over $15 million during the 1.5 years it traded, 
and volume of about $3 million on election day.
2  While this is extremely liquid by 
prediction market standards, clearly more liquidity would be needed to allow for 
meaningful hedging.  Hedgestreet.com, a new CTFC-sanctioned derivative market, is 
attempting to create markets that individuals could use for such hedging, with a focus 
more on economic risks such as mortgage rates and real estate prices than on politics. 
Will these great expectations for prediction markets be fulfilled?   We argue that it 
depends in large part on developing answers to five open questions: 
1.  How to attract uninformed traders?  Counterintuitively, the problem for most 
prediction markets is attracting sufficient uninformed order flow.  Markets need 
uninformed order flow in order to function; with only rational traders trading whose 
only trading motivation is expected returns, the No Trade Theorem binds and the 
market unravels (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).  Uninformed order flow can have a 
variety of motivations (entertainment, overconfidence, hedging), but with the 
                                                 
2  These figures include the trading on a symmetric “Kerry to win” contract.   3
exception of hedging, these motivations are usually non-economic, putting 
economists at a comparative disadvantage in predicting which markets will succeed. 
2.  How to tradeoff interest and contractability?  A fundamental problem in 
mechanism design is that the outcomes of interest are often impossible to write into 
contracts.  Running financial markets on policy outcomes in and of itself does nothing 
to help with this problem.  In fact, using a measure to set payoffs for financial 
contracts can turn what would otherwise be a good proxy for a policy outcome into a 
problematic one, as illustrated by the recent experience with the manipulation of cash 
settlement prices for the S&P and municipal bond futures. 
3.  How to limit manipulation?  In addition to manipulation of the outcomes on which 
prediction markets are based, one might worry about manipulation of prediction 
market prices themselves, particularly where high-stakes decisions are made based on 
the prices. 
4.  Are markets well calibrated on small probabilities?  Many of the proposed uses of 
prediction markets will involve the evaluation of small probability events.  A range of 
behavioral evidence suggests that people are quite poor at distinguish small 
probabilities from tiny probabilities, and even when arbitrage is possible, frictions can 
cause this miscalibration to carry over into market prices. 
5.  How to separate correlation from causation?  Contingent prediction markets allow 
one to estimate the probability of an event contingent on another event occurring.  
Thus contingent markets provide insight into the correlation of events.  However, 
determining whether one event causes the probability of another to change is a 
separate and potentially more important question.  Many of the proposed uses of 
decision markets presuppose that the direction of causality can be readily established. 
 
A Framework 
Before discussing these questions, it is useful to introduce a simple model that can 
serve as a common framework for thinking about most of these questions.  We do this by 
taking the basic setup from the familiar Kyle (1985) model and adding transaction costs,   4
which we believe may be an important factor shaping the efficiency of pricing in small-
scale prediction markets, and market maker risk-aversion, which allows uninformed order 
flow to affect prices. 
As in Kyle (1985), we consider three types of agents:  perfectly-informed traders, 
uniformed (noise or liquidity) traders, and perfectly competitive market makers.  Trade is 
in a binary prediction market security that pays y=$1 if an event occurs and y=$0 
otherwise. 
The probability that the event occurs is given by q; this probability is observed by 
the market makers.  The perfectly-informed traders have inside information and know 
whether the event will occur.  The uninformed traders have a noisy subjective expectation 
of the event probability given by q plus a noise term η.  All traders have log utility, and 








= , where w is their wealth, p is the price of the security, e is their 
subjective expectation that the event occurs, and these parameters yield demand for x 
prediction securities.
3 
In addition, we can allow the uninformed traders to derive a direct utility benefit 
from holding a particular position, perhaps for gambling or entertainment reasons.  If this 
direct benefit has a per-unit certainty-equivalent of g, then the uninformed trader will 
trade as if e = q + η + g.  Alternatively, if the market price is being used in a decision, 
traders may have other (external) reasons to trade in order to affect the price.  As such, g 
may represent the gains to market manipulators from their effect on the equilibrium price.  
Thus, for manipulators, g would be equal to the product of the marginal price impact of 
their trading and the outside benefit they receive from moving the price. 
This framework also lends itself quite naturally to considering a hedging motive 
for trade.  Risk-averse traders have a hedging demand when their wealth depends on 
whether the event occurs.  We can view this as beginning trading with an endowment of 
contracts, and optimal hedging simply involves deciding how much of this endowment to 
                                                 
3  To derive the above, solve the traders’ problem:  Set x to maximize subjective expected utility 
E[U]=e*ln[w + (1-p)x] + (1 – e)*ln(w – px).   5
sell at the market price.  In this setup, if the trader’s wealth is H lower if the event 
happens, the trader will trade as if e = q + η + g + H*p*(1-p)/w. 
So to summarize, traders trade based on the sum of objective probability (q), 
expectation errors (η), gambling and manipulation motives (g), and a hedging motive 
related to the risk in the endowment of traders (H).  These different beliefs and motives 
are summarized in the variable e which is drawn from the distribution F(e). 
If traders face a per-contract transaction cost, t, they will buy if e – t > p and sell 
if e + t < p. 
A competitive group of market makers will post bids and offers such that the 
marginal utility of an additional trade, if made, is zero.  These conditions are: 
Pbid = E(y|e + t<Pbid) – tMM – cxMM 
Pask = E(y|e - t>Pask) + tMM –  cxMM 
where c = p (1 – p)/w captures the risk-averse market maker’s desire to shade 
prices lower when she built up a large exposure (xMM) in this market. 
With no informed traders, the market makers expectations do not change with the 
order flow, so Pbid = q – tMM – cxMM and Pask = q + tMM – cxMM.  (Note that due to their 
desire to limit exposure, market makers will however change prices in response to new 
orders.)  Traders only buy or sell when their subjectively held beliefs differ from the 
market maker’s prices by at least the sum of their own and the market makers transaction 
costs (when |e – (q - cxMM )| >= t + tMM).  The equilibrium bid-ask midpoint must satisfy: 
1
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where Xbuy and Xsell are total demand from buyers and sellers, respectively. 
Transaction costs cause trading to be done entirely by the traders with the most 
noisy observations of the event probability or, alternatively, with the greatest external 
motivations (gambling, hedging, or manipulation) for holding the securities.  The market   6
maker’s observation of the objective probability does help hold market prices close to 
their efficient levels (q), but market maker risk aversion, combined with a asymmetry in 
the distribution of e – q, can cause prices to deviate from objective probabilities.  (For 
more on this issue, see Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2005). 
Adding perfectly-informed traders has two effects.  The perfectly-informed 
traders buy when y=1 and sell when y=0, affecting market maker inventory in a way that 
pushes the final bid-ask midpoint toward y.  At the same time, these traders force the 
market maker to add an adverse-selection component to the bid-ask spread, which causes 
the uninformed traders to be further restricted to those with extreme values of e.
4  Too 
much informed trade can cause markets to unravel, and this is especially likely when high 
transaction costs are already limiting uninformed trade.
5 
The discussion above suggests that low transaction costs are essential to liquid, 
active, and informative prediction markets.  Adding a fixed pool of perfectly informed 
traders leads these insiders to effectively levy a tax on the trading of market-makers and 
traders, and greater expected volume can lower the contribution toward this fixed cost 
required from each trade.  High and low liquidity equilibria may be simultaneously 
possible.  This brings us to our first open question: Will prediction markets attract 
necessary uninformed trade? 
 
                                                 
4  Suppose that λ traders are informed, each informed trader buys one contract, and 1 – λ traders are 
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, where the first term in each expression is the 
expectation of y conditional on receiving a buy or sell order.  With λ = 0, this first term is always equal q 
(the marketmaker’s unbiased prior), but as λ increases, Pask increases and Pbid decreases, leading to wider 
spreads and less uninformed trading. 
5  In the expressions in footnote 4, it is easy to show that Pask is increasing and Pbid decreasing in t and tMM.  
It is likewise straightforward to show that when λ > 0, then for distributions of e that have min(e) > 0 and 
max(e) < 1, there will be a level of t that leads to market unraveling, i.e. to  Pask = 1 and Pbid = 0 being the 
only values that satisfy the expressions in footnote 4.   7
Attracting Uninformed Traders 
An important implication of the model sketched above is that the success of the 
prediction market in generating trade depends critically on attracting uninformed traders.
6  
Prediction markets are too small for meaningful hedging, and are likely to remain so for 
some time, so the primary motivations for uninformed order flow are likely to be 
entertainment and overconfidence.  Economists may be at a comparative disadvantage in 
analyzing these motivations, but we can look at what has worked. 
Risk love or the “thrill of a gamble” provide obvious motives for uninformed 
traders, and both Tradesports and Betfair have successfully attracted many sports bettors 
to their markets.  Tradesports runs a variety of non-sports markets, but the contracts that 
attract significant volume on Tradesports are typically those with popular currency (the 
Presidential election, the fate of Saddam Hussein and Martha Stewart, outcomes on 
American Idol and the Apprentice) suggesting primarily an entertainment motive for 
trading.  Beyond sports bettors, Tradesports has been quite successful at marketing its 
platform to those employed in financial markets, a pool of risk-acceptant traders. 
At the same time, contracts on more “serious” topics (economic numbers, 
financial market outcomes, contingent political contracts) attract volume that compares 
favorably with volumes on the successful Iowa vote share markets.  These traders may 
have been attracted more by the substantial free media Tradesports has received, and 
uninformed trading in these contracts may more of a combination entertainment and 
overconfidence motives.  As the wonkishness of the contract rises, however, volume and 
liquidity falls rapidly.  The few Tradesports markets of the sort planned by the DARPA 
Policy Analysis Market (e.g., will there be a Palestinean state by 2005?) have not been 
very successful. 
The legal environment has forced onshore prediction markets to make 
compromises that have limited their attractiveness.  The Iowa Electronic Markets agreed 
to limit positions to $500 in order to receive a “no action” notice from the Commodity 
                                                 
6 The term “uninformed” overstates the requirement, which is that the market must attract traders whose 
estimate of the true probability is less precise than the market-maker’s, or whose hedging demand causes 
them to trade even when their beliefs coincide with the market-maker.   8
Futures Trading Commision (CFTC).
7  This compromise limits the scope and depth of 
their markets, and also possibly their efficiency.  For example, the “Will Bush win the 
popular vote?” contracts on Tradesports and Iowa often trade at levels different enough 
to imply arbitrage opportunities, albeit opportunities to win only small amounts, given the 
position limits on the Iowa exchange.
8 
Other markets made other compromises.  Platforms such as Newsfutures, the 
Hollywood Stock Exchange, and the Foresight Exchange operate using play money, 
albeit play money that can sometimes be converted into prizes.  Many economists may be 
skeptical that play money markets solve the cheap talk problem that prediction markets 
are meant to solve, and indeed play-money and real-money market prices can and do 
diverge.  That said, a comparison of Newsfutures and Tradesports prices for securities 
predicting NFL victories for the 2003 season found that while the two markets often 
yielded different predictions, they were approximately equally well calibrated (Servan-
Schreiber, Wolfers, Pennock and Galebach, 2004). 
The consulting firms running corporate prediction markets have taken the same 
approach as experimental economists on campuses:  they have subsidized participation, 
allowing everyone to leave a winner, albeit to varying degrees.  The Policy Analysis 
Market was also supposed to have involved a subsidy for participation.  If the 
information to be generated by the market is important enough to justify the subsidy and 
a willing financier can be enlisted, then this approach can work.  It is important, however, 
that subsidies are not designed in such a way that they can be gamed, as one could 
imagine with per-trade subsidies or with some schemes for subsidization via a money-
losing market maker. 
Finally, two markets that we are aware of, Economic Derivatives and Hedgestreet, 
have obtained permission to operate as futures exchanges by the CFTC.  Both have 
avoided political contracts and focused on economic events, probably to avoid being 
considered betting venues as opposed to financial markets.  Hedgestreet has only recently 
                                                 
7  The Iowa markets are run as a research project by academics at the Tippie College of Business at the 
University of Iowa.  They are described in Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and Wright (1992). 
8  For example, this contract averaged 52 on Iowa during the month of August 2004 and about 46 on 
Tradesports.   9
started up, but Economic Derivatives, a joint venture by Deutsche Bank and Goldman 
Sachs that runs markets in economic numbers, has been operating since 2002.  Its traders 
are all institutional, and its markets have attracted volumes of hundreds of millions of 
dollars.  Traders reportedly trade for hedging reasons.  In addition, a combination of 
overconfidence and career concerns motivations may provide a motivation for trading – 
no self-respecting economic analyst would want to admit that they only know as much as 
their average colleague. 
Career concerns may conceivably provide a participation motivation in some of 
the business and policy applications that are being considered.  If the decision to trade is 
motivated by career concerns, however, the trading itself may reflect objectives other 
than maximizing trading profits.  For instance, while rank-order tournaments can 
replicate first-best incentives in many career models, in the trading context they may lead 
to “doubling up,” or related high-variance strategies. 
To summarize, three routes to attracting order flow have been successful thus far:  
offering sports betting, subsidization, and, possibly, exploiting career concerns.  Each has 
their drawbacks, however. 
 
Balancing Interest and Contractability 
Observable indicators of contractability have thus far had little explanatory power 
for a prediction market’s success.  Contracts on the Iowa Market have multi-page 
prospectuses clearly outlining how the market will settle under a number of 
contingencies, whereas contract “prospectuses” on Tradesports are often limited to the 
single sentence below the contract name on the trading screen.  In some cases, this 
sentence is supplemented by a short memo announcing the contract, but even then issues 
that have material effect on event probabilities are only subsequently clarified in response 
to questions.  For example, Tradesports offered a contract on whether Yasser Arafat 
would depart the Palestinean state by the end of 2005.  When he became ill in late 2004, 
there was mild controversy on forum.tradesports.com about whether seeking medical 
treatment in Paris or dying was considered departing Palestine.  Tradesports tightened the 
contract definition to include the latter but not the former.   10
Tradesports traders have thus far been willing to trust the exchange to make a 
good faith determination, and this trust is helped by the fact that Tradesports does not 
itself hold positions in any of its contracts and that it has a clear need to maintain a 
reputation for fairness among its traders.  But as the sums traded become more 
substantial, traders may begin to worry more about these issues.  As the example of the 
Arafat Security illustrates, in some cases there is no definition that captures the event of 
interest perfectly.
9 
This issue is likely to become even more salient once contracts start trading on 
policy outcomes.  Many policy outcomes are notoriously difficult to reduce to a simple 
set of measures.  To take one of the less problematic examples, suppose one runs a 
prediction market on the crime rate in Baghdad.  One presumably cares about the total 
crime rate, but a contract is more likely to be written on the reported crime rate.  The 
reported crime rate may have historically been a reasonable proxy for the actual crime 
rate, but this relationship may not hold up for several reasons.  Reported crimes may be 
an inverted U-shaped function of true crimes – at some point, the reported rate may 
decline as the true rate rises.  Furthermore, if individuals can influence the reported crime 
rate and these individuals have incentives to do so, either arising from, or independent of 
the prediction market, the two rates can diverge. 
These issues may also arise in business contexts.  One might view a tracking 
stock as analogous to a prediction market security on the future stream of a business 
unit’s profits.  Tracking stocks have been greeted with some skepticism given the 
incentive of the parent company to influence the business unit’s reported profits through 
devices such as transfer pricing. 
 
                                                 
9  Another example of a Tradesports contract whose definition was later clarified is the “Will Bush win the 
electoral votes of Maine?” contract.  One might have supposed this meant all 4 electoral votes, but the 
exchange determined after the contract had been trading for several months that 3 out of 4 would suffice.  
In the same vein, Leigh, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2003) we commented on the judgment that would have 
been required to settle the “Will Saddam Hussein be out of office” contract had a contract been expiring on 
April 9, 10, or 11; the active trading on this contract suggests that many traders were comfortable with this 
possible ambiguity.   11
Managing Manipulation 
Just as thinking about the contractability of the outcomes of interest raises 
questions about outcome manipulation, the prospect of basing decisions on prediction 
markets raises questions about the potential for price manipulation. 
In some of the applications that have been proposed for prediction markets, one 
might expect these outside interests to be the dominant determinant of traders’ positions.  
For example, if a market were run among industry participants on which technological 
standard the industry should adopt, one could imagine that trading would be driven 
primarily by an interest in influencing the outcome.  With no firm-level position limits, 
one could imagine such a market turning into an auction; with position limits, it could 
turn into voting.  Either mechanism may be a satisfactory way of choosing a standard 
(ignoring potential anti-trust concerns), but arguably simply running an auction would be 
more transparent than (and thus preferable to) running a prediction market that 
approximated an auction. 
Manipulation can be made more expensive by allowing free entry into these 
markets and by providing a means for entrants to invest in becoming informed (Hanson 
and Oprea, 2004).  Known attempts to manipulate public prediction markets have largely 
failed.  Pat Buchanan’s supporters reportedly attempted to bid up his price on the Iowa 
markets, and in the 2004 election cycle, several large sales of the Tradesports Bush 
reelection contract temporarily pushed down its price, on September 14 from 63 to 49, 
and on October 16 from 53 to 10.  In these cases, however, the price impact of these 
trades was reversed within 24 hours.  Strumpf (2004) ran an explicit experiment of 
randomly placing $500 trades on the Iowa markets, and likewise found that the price 
impact was only temporary. 
While free entry can offset the effects of manipulators, it may be undesirable in 
corporate contexts where the firm wishes to appropriate returns to the information 
aggregated in the market.  Beyond secrecy concerns, acquiring the information to become 
an informed trader may be costly enough that free entry does not offset the trading 
activity of manipulators. 
   12
Ensuring Calibration on Small Probabilities 
An exception to the generally good predictive track record of betting and 
prediction markets is their performance on low-probability events.  The best-documented 
example is the favorite-longshot bias in horse racing (Thaler and Ziemba, 1988).  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this point, based on data from a large sample of North American 
horse races and from the Iowa markets, respectively.  Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004a) 
discuss a similar mispricing from S&P 500 index contracts on Tradesports.  In both 
examples, market prices overestimate the probability of unlikely events.  In horseracing, 
the overestimation is greatest for events priced below 5 percent, on Iowa, it is present for 
events priced between 0.2 and 0.3. 
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Source: Trackmaster, Inc. Sample is all horse races in the United States, 1992-2002.  n=5,067,832 starts in 611,807 races.
Favorite-Longshot Bias: Rate of Return at Different Odds
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Figure 2 
































Graph plots the average expiry price of a winner-take-all contract on the Iowa market, conditional on its 
current price.  Data is divided by current price into groups that are 2.5 percentage points wide.  Error bars 
are 95 percent confidence intervals of the estimate of the mean expiry price, calculated from standard 
errors that are adjusted for sampling the same contract type multiple times.  Consecutive groups, however, 
contain many of the same contracts and thus group means are not indpendent of each other.
 
A range of experiments by psychologists suggest that the inability to distinguish 
small from tiny probabilities is not specific to prediction markets, but rather a result of 
behavioral biases. 
A complementary view also suggests that specific types of trading behavior may 
lead to an overestimation of small probabilities.  Manski (2004) considered a setting in 
which prediction market traders set their bet sizes to maintain a constant downside risk.  
If this is the case, they demand 24 times as many contracts when going long at $0.04 than 
when shorting the same contract, and, even absent transaction costs, a market price of 
$0.04 will reflect the beliefs of traders at the 96
th percentile of the beliefs distribution.
10  
Thus, if errors in subjective probability assessments are symmetric, markets may 
overestimate low probabilities.  Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005) analyze a broader class of 
models and find these biases to be generally quite small. 
                                                 
10  Whether traders use such a budgeting rule is of course an empirical question that remains to be 
answered.   14
The framework discussed earlier provided a candidate reason why these biases 
can persist in equilibrium.  The intuition for the result is that when transaction costs are 
positive, prices near zero or one are set by those with extreme opinions.  To give a 
concrete example, suppose the objective probability for an event is 3 percent, and the 
market-maker’s transaction cost (tMM), is 1 percent.  In the absence of informed trading or 
a net market maker position, a market maker will be willing to buy at $0.02 and sell at 
$0.04 percent.  If traders also face a transaction cost, (t) of $0.01, then they will buy if 
their subjective probability is greater than 5 percent and sell if it is less than 1 percent.  
The former involves an overestimate by a factor of 1.67, the latter an underestimate by a 
factor of 3.  Given these magnitudes, overestimates may be more common than 
underestimates, leading a risk-averse market maker to set a bid-ask midpoint greater than 
the objective probability. 
 
Separating Correlation and Causation 
Decision market securities are designed to allow one to estimate how expectations 
of policy outcomes vary with the policy chosen.  For example, the Iowa markets ran 
contracts that paid one penny for each percentage point of the two-party vote share won 
by the Democrats, conditional on the trader also correctly picking the winner of the 
Democratic nomination race.  The ratio of the price of this contract to the price of a 
contract that pays $1 if the candidate is nominated yields an estimate of the expected vote 
share of each candidate, conditional on the candidate being nominated.  In Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2004a), we reported that the expected vote shares on January 29, 2004 were 
55% for John Edwards, 50% for John Kerry, and 46% for Howard Dean – if the relevant 
candidate were to win the nomination.   15
Table 1: Contingent Markets: 2004 Presidential Election 
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Republican  
Vote Share against 
this Candidate 












John Kerry  $0.344  $0.342  68.6%  50.1% 
John Edwards  $0.082  $0.066  14.8%  55.4% 
Howard Dean  $0.040  $0.047  8.7%  46.0% 
Wesley Clark  $0.021  $0.025  4.6%  45.7% 
Other Democrats  $0.015  $0.017  3.2%  46.9% 
Notes: Columns A and B show the prices of contracts that pay a penny for each percentage of the two-party 
popular vote won by Democrats or Republicans respectively, conditional on picking the winner of the 
Democratic nomination.  (Contracts pay $0 if the selected candidate does not win the Democratic 
nomination.) 
Source: Closing prices January 29, 2004, Iowa electronic markets. 
 
It is tempting to draw a causal interpretation from these results:  that nominating 
John Edwards would have produced the highest Democratic vote share.  Indeed, as the 
name “decision markets” implies, this is the inference that we are intended to draw, and 
in many circumstances, the most likely source of a correlation will be causal.  (Berg and 
Rietz, 2003, provide a related account of markets on the 1996 Republican nomination.) 
But alternative explanations exist.  For example, on January 29
th, Edwards was 
behind in the delegate count, and only rated a 15% probability of winning the 
nomination. A come-from-behind victory would arguably have required a very good 
campaigning performance by Edwards or a shift in public sympathies towards his “Two 
Americas” message, either of which would have boded well for his general election 
performance.  The decision market tells us that in the state of the world in which Edwards 
wins the nomination, he will also probably do well in the general election.  This is not the 
same as saying that he will do well if, based on the decision market, Democrats nominate 
Edwards.
11 
A related example of the difficulties of separating correlation from causation 
comes from the analyses in the financial press of the correlation of President Bush’s 
                                                 
11  Hanson (1999 and 2004) mentions this issue as well, referring to it as “decision selection bias.”    16
reelection chances with the performance of the stock market.
12  Figure 3, from Snowberg, 
Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2005), shows the close relationship between the level of the 
stock market and the Tradesports contract tied to Bush’s re-election.  Regressing the 
(log) level of S&P on the level of Bush price yields a coefficient of 0.204, which led 
several commentators to infer that Bush’s reelection would raise the S&P by 20.4 log 
percentage points.  Difference specifications, which are appropriate given that these are 
asset prices, yield an estimated effect of 8-16 percentage points.
13 
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Only a few careful commentators noted the potential of an endogeneity issue: bad 
economic news was hurting both financial markets and Bush’s re-election prospects.  The 
disappointing non-farm payrolls report released three weeks prior to the election provides 
a stark example of the importance of this omitted causal link:  immediately upon the 
                                                 
12  See, for example, Browning, E.S. “As Bush Goes So Goes the Market,” Wall Street Journal, 9/20/2004, 
p. C1. 
13  As we encountered in our analysis of the Saddam Security in Leigh, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2003), bid-
ask bounce and slow incorporation of information into the Tradesports security require using specifications 
that allow for these issues.    17
report’s release, the Bush re-election contract fell by 1.5 percentage points (and the S&P 
500 future fell by about 0.5 percent). 
A common approach to endogeneity issues is to use instrumental variables 
estimation.  In this context, a valid “instrumental event” must affect Bush’s reelection 
probability and affects the stock market only through Bush’s reelection probability.  The 
third debate provides one such example.
14  In the three-hour period consisting of the 
debate and 1½ hours of post-debate spin, the Bush reelection security fell 3 percentage 
points and the S&P 500 rallied by 10 basis points.  The standard deviation of a three-hour 
S&P move at that time of day is about 9 basis points, so a 95 percent confidence interval 
around the estimated market effect of the debate would range from -8 to +28 basis points.  
Scaling this up to an estimate of the effect of the re-election of President Bush relative to 
a Kerry counterfactual suggests that the effect of Bush’s reelection can be bounded by 
-9.3 and +2.7 percentage points.  Wherever the true causal effect lies in this interval, we 
can be confident that the naïve inference that a Bush White House would raise the value 
of U.S. equities by 20 percent, was false. 
As Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2005) report, an even starker experiment 
was provided on election night 2004.  Figure 4 shows the price of the Bush security on 
Tradesports, sampled every ten minutes, and the S&P 500 (or the December S&P future 
when the New York markets closed).  Clearly there is strong co-movement in the chart, 
but the magnitudes are particularly interesting.  From 3pm-6pm various websites leaked 
early exit polls that suggested a likely Kerry presidency.  These revelations were 
accompanied by a 1 percent decline in the S&P and roughly a 25 percentage point decline 
in the Bush security (from 55 to 30).  Later that evening, election returns overturned the 
exit polls, and from 8:30 pm to 1:00 am ET the Bush security rallied from 30 to over 90 
and the stockmarket increased by about 1.5 percent.
15  The former movement scales to an 
                                                 
14  The other debates are unfortunately of less use.  For the first debate there were no instant polls to 
objectively determine a winner; it took at least one news cycle for a consensus to emerge that Kerry had 
won, and this leaves us with too long an event window.  The second debate was on a Friday evening when 
futures markets were closed, and the Vice Presidential debate was considered to be approximately a draw. 
15  The slow incorporation of information in prediction markets is illustrated by Figure 4.  The bulk of the 
exit poll related movement occurred between 2:50 and 3:30 PM ET in the stock market while it lasted until 
5:30 ET in the Tradesports reelection market.  Likewise, the subsequent rally began about 10-20 minutes 
earlier in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange than on Tradesports.   18
estimated Bush effect of +4 percentage points (=-1/-25), the latter to an estimate of +2.5 
percentage points (=1.5/60).
16  Again, these experiments strongly suggest a different 
causal effect of a Bush presidency on the stockmarket than a naïve interpretation of 
Figure 3 suggested. 
Figure 4 
 
Finally, an instrumental variables approach could potentially be extended to 
decisions markets.  For instance, we argued earlier that the price of the “Democrat Vote 
Share if Edwards” contingent security only provided an estimate of the correlation 
between Edwards winning the nomination and the Democrats vote share.  An ideal 
instrument for Edward’s receiving the nomination would be an event that affected the 
likely winner of the Democratic primary, but not Edwards’ general election chances.  
One such event might have been if a sex scandal hurt his only rival.
17  And indeed, rather 
                                                 
16  Standard deviations of S&P changes during the 2:50 to 3:30 PM and 8:30 PM to 1:00 AM windows are 
26 and 12 basis points respectively.  These imply standard errors of roughly 1 and 0.2 percentage points 
respectively. 
17  Of course, a sex scandal involving a senior Democrat might affect the general public’s views of all 
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than waiting for the event to occur (or as Matt Drudge did, pretending it occurred), we 
could run prediction markets to derive the market’s expectations of the relevant moments 
required for an IV estimator. 
That is, an “IV prediction market” would require five contracts, from which one 
could derive the two moments required for an IV estimate: 
•  A contract paying $1 if Edwards is nominated, P1=p(Edwards) 
•  A contract paying $1 if Edwards is nominated and a scandal occurs, 
P2=p(Edwards & Scandal) 
•  A contract paying $1 if a scandal occurs, P3 = p(Scandal) 
•  A contract paying the Democratic vote share if Edwards is nominated and 
a sex scandal occurred, P4 = E[Democrat Votes | Edwards & Scandal) * 
p(Edwards & Scandal) 
•  A contract paying the Democratic vote share if Edwards is nominated, 
P5 = E(Democrat Votes|Edwards)*p(Edwards) 
The ratio P2/P3 yields the probability of Edwards’ nomination conditional on a 
scandal, p(Edwards|Scandal).  Further, subtracting the unconditional probability of 
Edwards winning the nomination (P1) yields the increase in probability resulting from the 
scandal: P2/P3-P1 = p(Edwards|Scandal) – p(Edwards).  This difference is analogous to 
the first-stage regression coefficient in a Wald Estimator.  Likewise, the ratio P4/P3 yields 
Edwards’ expected general election vote share condition on a scandal: E{[E(Democrat 
Votes|Edwards)*p(Edwards)]|Scandal}*p(Edwards|Scandal).  Subtracting the expected 
Democratic vote share if Edwards is nominated (P5) yields the effect of the scandal on 
Edwards’ expected general election vote share: P4/P3 - P5 = E[Democrat Votes * 
p(Edwards) | Scandal] – E[Democrat Votes * p(Edwards)].  This difference is analogous 
to the coefficient from the reduced-form regression.  The ratio of the reduced-form and 
the first-stage regression coefficients yields the “Prediction IV” Wald estimator, which in 
this case would be the ratio of the scandal’s effect on Edwards’ expected general election 












The numerator of this ratio is the increase in Edwards’ expected general election 
vote share resulting from the scandal, and the denominator is the increase in his 
probability of being nominated.  Given our identifying assumption that the scandal does 
not affect Edwards’ general election chances, this ratio provides an estimate of Edwards’ 
general election performance in states of the world in which he would not have won the 
nomination but for an exogenous event.
18 It seems plausible that “IV prediction markets” 
like this better identify causal parameters, and hence yield estimates that are more 
directly applicable for decision making.
19 
Of course, while we are optimistic that “Prediction IV’s” are feasible, they run 
into the same five open questions that we asked in this paper: 
•  Would traders be willing to trade the relevant securities?  This is 
particularly problematic given that few traders have a need to hedge 
against the types of possible events that make for plausibly exogenous 
experiments. 
•  Are the relevant outcomes contractible? 
•  Are these markets manipulation proof?  Even though the prediction IV’s 
isolate the causal parameter of interest, as is well known, even small 
changes in the first-stage estimate (or market price) yield large changes in 
the estimated causal parameter, suggesting that the returns to manipulation 
may be large. 
•  Would the market be well calibrated on the small probabilities in these 
multi-state contingent contracts? 
                                                 
18 Note that as with most applications of IV methods, we identify a Local Average Treatment Effect 
(LATE).  Naturally whether this is the causal parameter of interest depends on the context.  For example, if 
Edwards is of higher average quality in states of the world in which he can take advantage of a small 
scandal than in states of the world where he can take advantage of a large scandal, then a LATE estimator 
based on a small scandal may overstate the performance one could expect from exogenously choosing him 
as the nominee. 
19 Naturally this example shows only one of many such market designs that can be used to recover the 
causal parameter of interest.   21
•  Can we ever fully separate correlation from causation?  As with a lot of 
other empirical work, it can be hard to find experiments that truly do 
identify the causal parameter.  The one reason for real optimism on this 
front is that we no longer need wait for natural experiments, but rather can 
trade on the likely effects of experiments that may never happen. 
 
Conclusions 
In a previous paper (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004a), we reviewed much of the 
accumulated evidence on the operation of prediction markets, concluding on an 
optimistic note.  In this paper, we pose five questions that we argue require answers for 
prediction markets to reach their considerable potential.  The research agenda suggested 
by these questions spans several fields of economics and encroach significantly on related 
disciplines. 
The first question arguably falls more in the field of marketing than economics:  
how to attract uninformed order flow to markets?  This is important because these traders 
provide the potential profit motivating informed groups to trade.  Lower transaction costs, 
in both the monetary and the convenience sense, are important, but inherent interest or 
buzz is clearly an important determinant. 
Our second question concerns contractability: how does one trade off interest with 
outcome contractability?  Of course the domain of contracts has expanded considerably 
over the past few centuries, and there may be lessons in the history of contracts that 
prediction market designers would be well advised to follow. 
Third, many of the corporate and policy decision markets that have been proposed 
raise questions about manipulation, especially in environments where free entry by 
arbitrageurs cannot eliminate the problem.  With position limits, a prediction market may 
turn into voting; with no position limits, it may turn into an auction.  If the markets 
literally turn into a complicated version of a vote or an auction, presumably we are better 
off with the simple version.  But one might imagine situations in which they turn into a   22
hybrid, and more work into understanding when those hybrids are sensible mechanisms 
could be productive. 
Fourth, psychologists and insurance salesmen have known for years that most 
people are badly calibrated when evaluating small probabilities and some of their 
difficulties appear to be spilling over into prediction market pricing.  Given the current 
scale of prediction markets, the relevant limit to arbitrage is probably not the agency 
problems discussed in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) but rather transaction costs.  We are 
optimistic that both declining transaction costs, and carefully framed prediction market 
contracts will yield more accurate responses. 
Finally, there is the issue of separating causation and correlation, a difficult issue, 
but one that is more or less on empirical economists’ home turf.  For settings where 
interpretation of correlations is problematic we propose an “instrumental events” 
approach for analyses based on time series movements, and an analog in contingent 
markets - “Prediction IV’s” – which may help isolate causal parameters. 
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